PORTUGUESE COLONIAL EMPIRE IN AFRICA

One of the great ironies in the history of European colonialism is that the small country of Portugal established one of the first colonial empires and then retained its colonial possessions well after most other European nations had lost theirs.

In the fifteenth century, Portuguese sailors took the lead in developing the sea route around the largely unexplored African continent and across the Indian Ocean to the ports of Asia and to the spice-rich islands of the East Indies (now Indonesia). Marking their incremental exploration and extension of this trade route, the Portuguese established a string of outposts along the coast of West Africa at which their ships could reprovision, refit, and retreat from storms. The earliest of these outposts included Ceuta in Morocco (1415), Madeira (1419) and the Azores (1427) in the North Atlantic, and the fortress of Sa˜o Jorge da Mina in Guinea.

In 1482 Diogo Ca˜o (ca. 1450–1486) reached the mouth of the Congo River. In 1497 Bartholomeu Dias (ca. 1450–1500) rounded the Cape of Good Hope. And in 1498 Vasco da Gama (ca. 1469–1524) reached India. Along the eastern coast of Africa, the Portuguese then subjugated several largely Islamic port cities in Mozambique and farther north seized the ports at Brava, Kilwa, and Mombasa. The Portuguese also established commercial bases in India, in the East Indies, in China, and even in Japan, from which they were able to monopolize much of the European trade with Asia.

Although that trade was the chief prize, the Portuguese also found that the shorter-distance trade in African gold, ivory, and slaves was also extremely profitable.

In 1578 Portuguese King Sebastian was killed during a campaign against the Moors in Morocco. For the next six decades, the Hapsburg rulers of Spain and Austria also held the throne of Portugal, and Portugal’s imperial ambitions were subordinated to those of Spain.

Moreover, by the mid-sixteenth century, Spanish power was gradually eclipsed, first by the Dutch and then by the British, and in that complicated process, the Portuguese lost many of their commercial bases along the African and Asian coasts.

By the late eighteenth century, the Portuguese had managed to retain in Africa only the small colonies of Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Sa˜o Tome´ and Princıpe in West Africa and the much more extensive but largely undeveloped colonies of Angola and Mozambique in

southern Africa.

 During the Napoleonic era, the governance of Portugal again became very unsettled, and from 1808 to 1821 the royal family even transferred its seat of power to Brazil, Portugal’s largest overseas colony.

Then, after Brazil achieved independence in 1822, the Portuguese began to concentrate on developing their colonies in southern Africa, in large part to protect their claims in the face of the escalating competition to carve up the African interior into European colonies. In fact, at the Berlin Conference (1884–1885), the major European colonial powers insisted that Portugal demonstrate that it actually controlled the interiors of Angola and Mozambique.

 

For the next four decades, the Portuguese conducted an ongoing military campaign to subjugate the native African populations of its colonies in southern Africa.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, they had subdued the populous Ovimbundu states in central Angola. The large kingdom of the Kwanhana in southern Angola was not vanquished, however, until after World War I (1914–1918). Indeed, although the Portuguese formally declared in 1922 that Angola had been ‘‘pacified,’’ armed resistance to Portuguese rule continued throughout the colony, especially among the Bakongo and Mbundi people of northern Angola. In the process of ‘‘pacification,’’ the native Africans were displaced, and through a decree that made it a crime to be unemployed, most were forced to labor on the extensive coffee plantations that were established by the colonials.

The mixed-race Creoles who were descended from the earliest Portuguese traders and settlers and who were centered in the Luanda area in Angola initially prospered under the more formal colonial regime, but they gradually lost influence as resistance to Portuguese rule became more entrenched in the farther reaches of the colony. In Mozambique, Portugal had hoped to subdue the interior through the establishment of strong colonial agricultural communities. But when it became clear that Portugal lacked the resources to succeed in this effort, the Portuguese government sold economic concessions within regions of the colony to three international consortia.

 

Commercial mercenaries, these consortia could exploit the resources and native labor in the undeveloped interior in exchange for developing a rail system and other transportation and communication infrastructure that would accelerate European settlement.

In both Angola and Mozambique, the rise of the dictatorial regime of Antonio Salazar (1889–1970) in Portugal meant an increasingly repressive reaction to African demands for just treatment and political and economic rights. Especially in Angola, the Portuguese became expert at exploiting longstanding tensions among the dominant ethnic groups, and in both Angola and Mozambique, the native insurgencies became proxy conflicts in which the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was played out.

Through direct military and economic aid and covert operations, the United States supported the Salazar regime’s campaigns against the largely Soviet-supported insurgencies. In Angola, three independence movements developed—the MPLA (the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), the FNLA (the National Front for the Liberation of Angola), and UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). In Mozambique, the insurgency was dominated by Frelimo (the Mozambican Liberation Front), whose leadership had been trained in Algeria and Egypt.

After Salazar’s regime collapsed in 1974 and the new Portuguese government committed itself to a quick transition to independence in the colonies, the United States and Soviet Union supported contending African factions in the now-independent states—factions that they supported through, respectively, South African and Cuban surrogate forces. For the next decade and a half, both Angola and Mozambique were devastated by these ongoing and often very anarchic conflicts. By 2006, their economies had still not become self-sustaining, and large portions of their populations remained in refugee camps where large commitments of foreign aid provided basic foodstuffs and rudimentary medical care as a stopgap against mass starvation and epidemics.

After the end of the international slave trade in the 1830s, Portugal’s small West African colonies decreased in importance and became increasingly impoverished.

The Portuguese attempted to establish a plantation economy, but the fields in the Cape Verde Islands, in particular, were devastated by cyclic droughts. The Portuguese lacked the resources to compensate for the crop failures, and in at least seven periods between the 1770s and the late 1940s, between 15 percent and 40 percent of the islands’ population starved to death as a consequence.

After 18 percent perished from 1948 to 1949, the Portuguese government responded to international pressure and in 1951 designated the Cape Verde Islands as a province of Portugal. Educational and economic opportunities within Portugal were opened to Cape Verdeans.

Some of those educated in Portugal then returned to Cape Verde and went to Guinea-Bissau and Sa˜o Tome´ in order to provide the nucleus of an independence movement. In 1963 an active insurgency began in Guinea-Bissau, but it would take just over a decade for the ongoing insurgencies in all of Portugal’s African colonies to cause the collapse of the Salazar regime and to achieve independence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abshire, David M., and Michael A. Samuels, eds. Portuguese Africa: A Handbook. New York: Praeger, 1969.

Cann, John P. Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961–1974. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1997.

Chilcote, Ronald H. Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa:

A Bibliography of Documentary Ephemera Through 1965.

Stanford, CA: Hoover Institutions on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1969.

Chilcote, Ronald H. Portuguese Africa. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall, 1967.

de Braganc¸a, Aquino, and Immanuel Wallerstein. The African Liberation Reader. 3 vols. London: Zed, 1982.

Duffy, James. Portugal in Africa. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962.

Ferreira, Eduardo de Sousa. Portuguese Colonialism in Africa, the End of an Era: The Effects of Portuguese Colonialism on

Education, Science, Culture, and Information. Paris: UNESCO Press, 1974.

Hammond, Richard James. Portugal and Africa, 1815–1910: A Study in Uneconomic Imperialism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1966.

Humbaraci, Arslan, and Nicole Muchnik. Portugal’s African Wars: Angola, Guinea Bissao, Mozambique. New York: Third Press, 1974.

Lyall, Archibald. Black and White Make Brown: An Account of a Journey to the Cape Verde Islands and Portuguese Guinea. London: Heinemann, 1938.

Marcum, John A. Portugal and Africa, the Politics of Indifference: A Case Study in American Foreign Policy. Syracuse, NY: Program of Eastern African Studies, Syracuse University, 1972.

Minter, William. Portuguese Africa and the West. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1972.

Moreira, Adriano. Portugal’s Stand in Africa. Translated by William Davis et al. New York: University Publishers, 1962.

Schneidman, Witney. Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal’s Colonial Empire. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2004.

Sykes, John. Portugal and Africa: The People and the War. London: Hutchinson, 1971.

THE BEGINING OF PORTUGUESE EMPIRE

The rise of the Portuguese empire during the sixteenth century still stands foremost in the national consciousness of today’s Portuguese. The epic The Lus´ıads by Luis Vaz de Camo˜es (1524–1580), a romanticized version of the first discoveries, is still very popular. This article discusses the political, military, and commercial driving forces behind the Portuguese expansion in the Atlantic, Africa, Asia, and Brazil, and the decline of the empire in Asia.

THE AFRICAN ADVENTURES

Portuguese expansion began in 1415 with the conquest of Ceuta (a city in Morocco) by King John I (1357–1433). His son, Prince Henry (1394–1460), sometimes erroneously called ‘‘the Navigator,’’ inherited his father’s rights to discover, privateer, and trade in the Atlantic Ocean and leased these privileges to his vassals. Some of them colonized the unpopulated islands of Madeira and the Azores in the North Atlantic. These islands became agricultural sources of sugar and wheat. Other Portuguese, driven by the desire to advance in the ranks of the nobility, as well as by their thirst for gold and the demand for slaves and pepper, accomplished the stepwise discovery of the West African coast.

After Henry’s death, King Alphonso V (1432–1481) received papal confirmation of his rights of conquest and mission. He declared a royal monopoly on the trade in gold, pepper, precious stones, civet cats (for their musk), and ivory, but leased the slave trade to private contractors.

Under King John II (1455–1495), Elmina (in Ghana) became a center for trade in gold and slaves. John also pushed Portuguese discoveries farther south along the African coast. In 1488 Bartolomeu Diaz (ca. 1450–1500) rounded the Cape of Good Hope and reached as far as present-day Mossel Bay, South Africa.

THE ASIAN EMPIRE

After the 1492 discovery by Christopher Columbus (1451–1506) of the West Indies, the two Iberian nations (Spain and Portugal) agreed in 1494 to divide the world in two halves. With the dividing line running through present-day Brazil (which at that time was still unknown

to Europeans), the Portuguese crown would become suzerain over the waters and lands in the eastern hemisphere, the Spanish crown over the west.

King Manuel I of Portugal (1469–1521), in the belief that he was ‘‘chosen’’ to defeat Islam, undertook his imperialistic task with mystic zeal. In 1497 Vasco da Gama (ca. 1469–1524) was sent to discover the Indies and find spices and Christians. Setting out along a course

that in the future would be followed by other European sailing traffic to India, and after various friendly and hostile encounters along the East African coast, da Gama arrived ten months later in Calicut on the southwest coast of India. His return voyage took almost a year.

The Portuguese navigator Pedro A ´ lvarez Cabral (ca. 1467–1520), leaving Lisbon in 1500, intended to follow the same route, but when crossing the Atlantic, Cabral sailed too far west and landed in Brazil. One of his ships returned to bring the news of its discovery; the rest of the fleet continued to Calicut.

By the time the Portuguese entered the Indian Ocean, it was a thriving trading area, with Arabs and Gujaratis (from Northwest India) as the main carriers of pepper from the south and textiles from the north of India. Arab and Gujarati traders exchanged these goods for East African products, as well as horses, silver, gold, and European merchandise coming through the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, or spices from Southeast Asia.

India’s Malabar Coast was divided into small principalities, with such rulers as the kolathiri of Cannanore, the zamorin (king) of Calicut, and the raja of Cochin. The Malabar trade, mainly pepper, was in the hands of immigrants: Mohammedans in Calicut and Jews and

Brahmins in Cochin.

Not surprisingly, the attempts of da Gama and Cabral to buy pepper and other spices in Calicut were thwarted by Muslim merchants. Cabral therefore turned to the raja of Cochin, who was the archenemy of the zamorin and was eager to supply the desired products.

On his second voyage, da Gama established a trading post in Cochin, but in Calicut he pursued a policy of intimidation, terrifying the other rulers of the Malabar Coast into expelling the Arab colonists. Da Gama’s ruthless behavior toward ‘‘enemies,’’ alternating with diplomacy toward the ‘‘enemies of the enemies,’’ would set the scene for further Portuguese expansion into Asia.

Upon da Gama’s return, King Manuel I widened the scope of his policies, expanding his title—King of Portugal, the Algarve, and Lord of Guinea—to include ‘‘the Conquest, Navigation, and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, and India.’’ The closure of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and the opening of trading and military posts throughout Asia became first priority.

Manuel’s first viceroy of India, Francisco de Almeida (ca. 1450–1510), erected forts at Sofala, Kilwa, and Mombassa on the East African coast. His son Lourenc¸o (d. 1508) established the first Portuguese treaty with one of the kings of Sri Lanka, promising protection against the king’s enemies in return for tribute in the form of cinnamon and elephants.

Almeida’s successor, Afonso de Albuquerque (ca.1460–1515), a great believer in Manuel’s imperialism, captured the island of Socotra (off the coast of presentday Yemen), hoping that it would be a suitable base from which to block the Red Sea trade to and from India.

However, Socotra was too far away to effectively control traffic through the Straits of Bab el Mandeb. Another attempt in 1513 to close the Red Sea with an attack on Aden failed, and the flow of spices to Europe via this route did not stop until 1610, when the Dutch were able

to undercut pepper prices in the Mediterranean.

In 1510 Afonso de Albuquerque captured Goa, a state on the west coast of India, which was to become the capital of the Portuguese State of India. In 1511 he took Malacca, the center of trade between South Asia, the Far East, and the Indonesian Archipelago. And in 1514 he managed to capture Hormuz, thereby gaining control over the traffic from the Persian Gulf. Thus, within fifteen years, a chain of military settlements was established that was expected to maintain control of sea traffic and to demand payment of license fees and excise duties.

However, after his death in 1515, Albuquerque was succeeded by Lopo Soares de Albergaria. Albergaria, who was in favor of free trade, set in motion the opening of the Asian seas to Portuguese private military and commercial initiatives, in total opposition to the centralism of

Albuquerque. The discovery in 1521 of the Philippines and the Moluccan spice islands by Ferdinand Magellan (ca 1470–1521), who sailed under the Spanish flag and made the awesome voyage through the straits that bear his name, caused the Portuguese to push further east and build a fort on Ternate, which was later relocated at Amboina (Ambon). In 1529 the Holy Roman emperor, Charles V (1500–1558), sold his rights in the Moluccas to the Portuguese crown, and the demarcation line with the Spanish hemisphere on that side of the globe was established east of these islands. As a result, the Portuguese believed they had the right of access to the Philippines, China, and the western part of the Japanese island of Honshu. However, the Spaniards refused to leave the Philippines, and after 1571 Manila became their gateway for imports from China and Japan and for the export of South American silver to Asia.

In 1534 Diu and Bassein (both in Gujarat, northwestern India) were added to the official Portuguese Empire, and in 1543 the Indian provinces of Salcete and Bardez were added. However, Portuguese private interests went far beyond the reach of state officials.

Although sea captains sometimes played the roles of diplomats and ambassadors between Goa and the indigenous rulers of the ports, they also sometimes assembled their own private armies to support their demand for trade or booty. Many Portuguese who had originally come as soldiers escaped from the control of the Portuguese state to become embedded in the local economies and trading networks of the Coromandel Coast, the Bay of Bengal, the Indonesian Archipelago, and the Far East. Futhermore, although their mission was financially dependent on Goa, Portuguese religious orders acted independently and spread their nets widely all over Asia.

In 1543 the Portuguese made their first appearance in Japan, and their Jesuit mission became particularly successful. In 1549 the Ming imperial court of China prohibited the Chinese from trading overseas and the Japanese from entering China. This gave Portuguese merchants the chance, with the Jesuits in Japan as intermediaries, to establish a monopoly in the exchange of Chinese silk, gold, and porcelain for Japanese silver. After 1557 Macao (on the southern coast of China) became a center of Portuguese private trade and missionary activity. 

THE ATLANTIC BASIN

The contrast between Brazil and the countries the Portuguese encountered in Asia could not have been sharper. The land had no proprietors, money did not exist, birds’ feathers were the main form of wealth, and many of the tribes were cannibals. In the early 1530s the Portuguese crown began to dispense land in the form of hereditary captaincies to people it wanted to reward. As a result, Brazil became a settlers’ colony, with plenty of room for private enterprise, including the hunting of Brazilian Indians to work as slaves on the plantations.

In addition, the Catholic Church found a wide-open field for missionary activities.

In 1533 large-scale sugar cultivation was introduced in Brazil. The Indian slaves who performed the heavy work were in the course of time replaced by African slaves shipped from the coasts of Guinea, Congo, and Angola.

In Congo, conversion of the local king and his sons to Christianity was a convenient inroad into the slave trade. Business in Angola was contracted out to private entrepreneurs.

As a result, freight traffic on the Atlantic became triangular: from Lisbon to Congo or Angola with brassware and textiles that had been bought in Antwerp, from there to Brazil with slaves, and from Brazil back to Lisbon with sugar.

Until the discovery of gold in the 1690s the further development of Brazil remained closely connected to the production of sugar, which in turn was dependent on the availability of black labor. By the end of the sixteenth century, Brazil was replacing Madeira in the sugar market.

In 1600 there were about thirty thousand Portuguese living in Brazil; by 1612 this number had grown to fifty thousand. In contrast, from Hormuz to Macao, there were not more than sixteen thousand people who considered themselves Portuguese at that time.

THE ASIAN TRADE

The king of Portugal controlled the building and equipage of ships for the Carreira da India (the Portuguese passage to India), as well as their navigation and trade, but others were allowed to share in this monopoly in exchange for a quinto (one-fifth) of the value of the merchandise brought back to Portugal.

Fleets of carracks and caravels would leave Lisbon annually by the end of March, arriving in Goa between September and November. Their cargoes consisted of people, arms, artillery, and other necessities to maintain the Portuguese presence in Asia, as well as silver and gold to buy merchandise for the return voyage. The return cargoes included pepper and other spices, cotton and silk, indigo, opium, camphor, furniture, ivory, gold jewelry, precious stones, Bahrain pearls, Persian silk and carpets, and porcelain and other Chinese products. Most of these goods were brought to Goa via established indigenous trading systems, which included the use of ca´filas, large fleets of small indigenous ships that had previously navigated along the west coast of India, but now sailed under the protection of the Portuguese maritime fleet after payment of a license fee (cartaz).

The crown organized ‘‘royal voyages’’ to areas where the Portuguese State of India had little or no control over local traffic. Most famous was the annual Great Voyage from Goa to Japan and back, with stops in Malacca (Melaka) and Macao. Other royal voyages traveled from Goa, Diu, and Cochin toward Coromandel, Bengal, Arakan, Pegu, the Malay Peninsula, Thailand, and the Indonesian Archipelago.

Because of the monsoon, the return vessels of the Carreira da India had to leave Goa before mid-January. The time available for carrying out repairs and loading cargoes was therefore relatively short, and late departures, bad maintenance, and overloading caused many ships to wreck during the return voyage, making the Carreira a high-risk business.

The Crown’s Withdrawal. The participation of the Portuguese crown in Asian trade diminished during the 1570s. Not only were Portugal’s royal voyages to Asia now leased in the form of concessions, but beginning in 1575 the Carreira da India underwent significant changes as German and Italian merchants were awarded contracts for its financing, operation, and pepper sales.

During the mid-1590s Portuguese New Christian merchants (descendants of Jews who by the end of the fifteenth century had been converted to Christianity) replaced the German and Italian merchants. Private merchandise, in particular cotton and silk, represented the major share of the value of their cargoes. In 1629 these financiers of the Carreira were allowed to leave Portugal to become moneylenders to the Spanish crown.

An attempt was made to establish a Portuguese East India company, but the project was abandoned in 1633.

By that time the shipping volume leaving Lisbon was less than half of what it had been earlier.

THE DECLINE OF PORTUGUESE IN ASIA

 The decline of the Portuguese Empire in Asia is often attributed to corruption by Portuguese officials, the preference for South America within the Spanish House of Habsburg that ruled Portugal from 1580 to 1640, or simply Dutch and English aggression. However, from the early 1620s the Portuguese State of India lost control of events mainly because of major indigenous political changes in Asia, such as the expansionist wars of Shah Abbas (1571–1629) of Persia (Iran) and of the Mughals in India, as well as the formation of a centralized state in Japan, which the English and the Dutch took advantage of. Low supplies of pepper and spices to Europe during the 1590s incited both the English and the Dutch to go and buy it for themselves. Besides trade, the Dutch United East India Company, established in 1602, aimed to thwart the Portuguese and Spanish, both of whom were under the reign of Philip II (1527–1598), the archenemy of the Dutch. As a result, Dutch shareholders had to wait until the early 1630s before their investments were fully honored.

In 1605 the Dutch United East India Company occupied the Portuguese fort at Amboina, and the Spanish took over the remaining Portuguese positions in the Moluccas. Portuguese merchants fled to Makassar (a port on Sulawesi in present-day Indonesia), where they continued their spice trade. Several Dutch attempts to conquer Malacca failed, and Dutch privateering in the South China Sea and blockades of Goa met with scant success. From the beginning of the seventeenth century, political changes in India brought new rulers who abolished existing contracts with the Portuguese and were looking for trade with European newcomers. For example, in Kanara on the southwest coast of India, where political and territorial divisions had enabled the Portuguese to obtain the lowest prices for rice, wood, and pepper, the Nayaks of Ikkeri gradually expanded their territory and absorbed the smaller principalities. Their next step was to contact the English for the sale of pepper, and to play them off against the Portuguese. The textile and indigo trade of Gujarat was the backbone of the Portuguese monopolistic cartaz system.

In 1612, however, the Mughal emperor Jahangir (1569– 1627), the successor of the conqueror Akbar (1542–1605), allowed the English to establish a trading post in Surat, and in 1620 a similar concession was made to the Dutch. Further Mughal expansion led in 1632 to the

conquest of Ahmadnagar, which brought the Portuguese forts at Chaul, Bassein, and Daman under Mughal protection.

In 1637 the English and the Dutch set up factories in the neighboring state of Bijapur. However, the most serious blow to the Portuguese State of India, both in terms of finances and prestige, was the conquest in 1622 of Hormuz by Shah Abbas of Persia, who thereafter allowed English and Dutch companies to establish trading posts in Bandar ‘Abbas, the port of Isfahan (in present-day Iran).

During the second decade of the 1600s, the increasing number of Christians in Japan (some 222,000 in 1609) came to be seen as a political threat for the ruling class. Harsh persecution of Christians and the expulsion of Portuguese missionaries were followed by a ban on both Christianity and Portuguese ships in Japan. The Japanese authorities allowed the Dutch to stay, however. The Dutch factory on the Japanese island of Deshima remained Japan’s only window to the Western world until well into the nineteenth century. In 1636 theDutch initiated a strategic siege of Malacca, along with seasonal blockades of Goa. Simultaneously supporting the Sri Lankan king of Kandy against the Portuguese, in 1640 the Dutch traders obtained access to the cinnamon trade in Sri Lanka. The Portuguese surrendered Malacca in 1641.

In China, the Manchu emperor’s entry into the palace of Beijing in 1644 marked the beginning of the Ching dynasty. Under the Ching, Canton (now known as Guangzhou) became a free harbor for foreign trading companies, although Macao remained an important point of departure for Portuguese merchant fleets. Another remainder of the Portuguese State of India was East Timor, which, after being ruled by a Dutch renegade and his descendants, was left in Portuguese hands in 1694.

The restoration of the Portuguese crown under the Braganca (Braganza) family in 1640 brought peace in Europe. However, the Anglo-Dutch conflicts of the 1650s and the rumor that the Portuguese might allow the English India Company free access to Portuguese possessions in Asia provoked the Dutch to capture the Portuguese settlements in southern India and Sri Lanka. Portuguese civilian communities in such places as Goa, Macao, and East Timor survived, under the Portuguese State of India, for another three hundred years.

VICTORY AROUND THE ATLANTIC

In 1621 the Dutch established the Dutch West India Company, which aimed to break the Iberian monopoly of colonization and trade in the New World and along the West African coast. In 1633 the Dutch conquered Pernambuco in northeastern Brazil, but an attempt to occupy Bahia failed. In 1637 Governor Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen (1604–1679) took control of the Portuguese city of Elmina in Ghana, a conquest followed in 1642 by the seizure of Luanda in Angola and the island of Sa˜o Tome´.

After the Portuguese restoration of 1640, however, the Dutch became more interested in trading with Portugal than in expanding their Brazilian colony. The number of Dutch troops in Brazil was reduced, and following a revolt of the Brazilian population the Dutch were only able to maintain control over Recife and a few other sites in Brazil. In 1648 the Portuguese recaptured Sa˜o Tome´ and Luanda, and in 1654 all Dutch troops in Brazil were withdrawn. In the treaty of 1661 the Dutch were indemnified for their loss of Brazil and received the same trading privileges as the English.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Blusse´, Leonard. ‘‘No Boats to China: The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635–1690.’’ Modern Asian Studies 30 (1996): 51–76.

Boxer, Charles R. The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825. London: Hutchison Co., 1969.

Boyajian, James C. Portuguese Trade in Asia Under the Habsburgs, 1580–1640. London: John Hopkins University Press, 1993.

Camo˜es, Luis Vaz de. The Lus´ıads. Translated by Landeg White. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Chaudhuri, K. N. Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Diffie, Bailey W., and George D. Winius. Foundations of the Portuguese Empire, 1415–1580. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977.

Engerman, Stanley L., and Joa˜o Ce´sar das Neves. ‘‘The Bricks of an Empire 1415–1999: 585 Years of Portuguese Emigration.’’

In The Journal of European Economic History, Vol. 26. Rome: Banca di Roma Quadrimestrale, 1997.

Godinho, Vito´rino Magalha˜es. ‘‘Portugal and Her Empire.’’ In The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. V. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1961.

Godinho, Vito´rino Magalha˜es. Os descobrimentos e a economia mundial, Vol. IV. Lisbon: Editorial Presenc¸a, 1991.

Kato, Eiichi. ‘‘Unification and Adaptation: The Early Shogunate and Dutch Trade Policies.’’ In Companies and Trade: Essays on

Overseas Trading Companies During the Ancien Re´gime, edited by Leonard Blusse´ and Femme Gaastra. Leiden, Netherlands:

Leiden University Press, 1981. Mauro, Fre´de´ric. Le Portugal, le Bre´sil et l’Atlantique au XVIIe Sie`cle (1570-1670) E ´ tude E ´ conomique. Paris: Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian, 1983.

Newitt, Malyn. A History of Portuguese Expansion 1400-1668. Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, 2005.

Russell-Wood, A. J. R. The Portuguese Empire, 1415–1808: A World on the Move. London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998.

Scammel, G. V. The First Imperial Age: European Overseas Expansion, c. 1400–1715. New York: Routledge, 1989.

Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500–1700: A Political and Economic History. New York: Longman,1993.

Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. The Career and Legend of Vasco da Gama. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Toby, Ronald P. State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu. Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1984.

van Veen, Ernst. Decay or Defeat? An Inquiry into the Portuguese Decline in Asia, 1580-1645. Leiden, Netherlands: Research School of Asian, African, and Amerindian Studies, Leiden University, 2000.

GERMANY’S AFRICAN COLONIES

The unification of Germany in 1871 constituted a watershed in Germany’s imperial agenda of acquiring colonies in Africa. A number of lobbying groups formed after the unification, including the West German Society for Colonization and Export (1881) and the Central Association for Commercial Geography and the Promotion of German Interests Abroad (1878). These groups exerted pressure on the government to acquire colonies abroad, especially in Africa, by arguing that Germany needed the territories to maintain its economic preeminence. The result was the founding of the German Colonial Association in 1882. The expansion of German industry and the growth of German maritime interests facilitated a more aggressive colonial program. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) was initially not a colonial expansionist, but he changed and signed on to the demands of the lobbying groups for a more proactive role in the race for colonies. Bismarck became convinced that it was imperative for Germany to move quickly if the country was to protect its trade and economic interests because of the emerging protectionist policies that would come with colonialism. This position was best articulated by the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce in 1884 when it

asserted that if Germany were not to forever renounce colonial possessions in Africa, especially the Cameroon coast, then it had to act swiftly by acquiring the territory.

Annexation of territory was a significant feature of the emerging protectionist imperial world order of the late nineteenth century. In addition, the prevailing international situation strengthened Bismarck’s resolve to acquire territories in Africa. The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 and imperial incursions by France into Africa and Asia combined to make the issue of colonies a national necessity that had to be embraced by Germany because of its preeminent role in continental European diplomacy and politics. Being the skillful politician he was, Bismarck also envisioned the politics of German colonies serving as a stabling force in domestic politics by emphasizing nationalism and the greatness of Germany internationally. Bismarck was a pragmatist and his drive to acquire colonies in Africa was largely a function of economic considerations, both real and potential, in the emerging imperial world order, European diplomacy, and domestic politics as well.

The Berlin Conference of 1884 to 1885, hosted by Bismarck, was a turning point because it not only recognized European colonial claims in Africa but also hastened the process of partition. The European powers agreed that those nations claiming parts of Africa had

to physically occupy them in order to legitimize those claims. Germany annexed South West Africa (present day Namibia) in 1884 after negotiations with Great Britain. In the same year Germany annexed a strip of coastline on the Gulf of Guinea, which was later expanded into the territory of German Cameroon. The acquisition of Togo completed German annexation of territory in West Africa. Germany acquired German East Africa (present-day mainland Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi) in 1885, and a formal protectorate was declared in 1890. However, formal boundaries were not concluded until the late 1890s.

Germany used concessionary companies during the infancy stages of establishing a colonial presence in the annexed territories. The companies were granted charters to administer the colonies on behalf of the German government. The concessionary firms were supported on the grounds that they would mobilize private capital for the purpose of investment in the colonies. The argument was that private enterprise would be less costly, both to the government and taxpayers, since the latter two would be spared the burden of financing the empire.

In South West Africa, German imperial interests were advanced by the German South-West Africa Company and in East Africa by the Imperial German East Africa Company. The companies failed to perform as expected because of two main factors. First, the companies lacked a strong capital base to undertake the various governmental functions, including constructing the infrastructure required for colonial control. Second, the companies were ill-equipped to contain uprisings during the initial stages of establishing imperial control.

By the end of the 1890s, direct governmental control had supplanted administration by concessionary companies. Germany developed a reputation for ruthlessness in dealing with uprisings in its colonies. The Herero Uprising of 1904 was ruthlessly suppressed, resulting in the deaths of nearly sixty thousand out of a population of eighty thousand. The Germans not only shot the victims but also poisoned the water holes from which survivors could have drawn water, resulting in the deaths of thousands more. Those who survived were forced into work camps and became the subject of various medical experiments and examinations.

In German East Africa, the Abushiri Revolt was ruthlessly suppressed in 1889. The same fate befell the Hehe community following an uprising in 1893 when their leader, Mkwawa, was arrested and hanged. The 1905 to 1907 Maji Maji Rebellion in southern German East Africa was equally stamped out when Germans resorted to a ‘‘scorched earth’’ policy that resulted in killings, as well as a massive destruction of crops. The Duala resistance in Cameroon was brutally suppressed. In Togo, the Dagomba fiercely resisted German intrusion, but were overwhelmed. The colonization of African territories by Germany was to a large extent achieved through forceful means, which included overt military campaigns, economic coercion, and land seizure and expropriation.

After the colonial wars of pacification, Germany proceeded to institutionalize political and economic control by putting in place an administrative structure. The colony was headed by a governor. The commanders of the armed forces in the colony, although answerable to the governor, retained a lot of power because they were subject to the High Command in Berlin. The military performed the vital function of maintaining power relations in the colony. A number of the officers also doubled as regional administrators. African chiefs were appointed and made subject to the authority of the local German officials, who were invariably few. The chiefs were supposed to undertake such functions as collecting taxes, conscripting labor for colonial projects, and enforcing government policy. The Germans established a colonial administration that embraced both direct and indirect rule that varied from one colony to another, and on occasions even within the same colonial territory.

The administration of justice in the German colonies was anything but impartial. Its function was to maintain the status quo on the erroneous premise that Africans were inferior, which led to the degrading practice of corporal punishment as well as the frequent arbitrary executions in the colonies. The Germans developed public hospitals as well as educational institutions. But even in these two areas, the facilities were inadequate to cope with the large number of people who desired health and educational services.

The German colonial government encouraged the participation of missionary societies in the provision of these services. The situation in the German colonies was hardly dissimilar from that in other European colonies in Africa. German colonial rule was still evolving by the

time World War I broke out. Africans were conscripted to fight on various warfronts in defense of German imperial interests. However, the end of the war in 1918 proved disastrous for Germany’s imperial ambitions in Africa. Germany was defeated and forced to surrender all its colonies, which were subsequently taken over by the other European imperial powers—Britain, France, Belgium, and in the context of South West Africa, South Africa.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baer, H. M. Carl Peters and German Colonialism: A Study in the Ideas and Actions of Imperialism. PhD diss., Stanford University, 1968.

Boahen, A. Adu, ed. Africa Under Colonial Domination, 1880– 1935. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. Abridged ed., 1990.

Smith, W. D. ‘‘The Ideology of German Colonialism, 1840–1906.’’ Journal of Modern History 46 (1974): 641–663.

Stoecker, Helmut, ed. German Imperialism in Africa: From the Beginnings Until the Second World War. Translated by Bernd Zollner. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1986.

Wesseling, H. L. Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa, 1880–1914. Translated by Arnold J. Pomerans. Westport, CT: Preager, 1996.